The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Herman Cappelen The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in Impression: 1. All rights reserved. No part of this. Liberating Content. The Inessential Indexical. Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever Oxford University Press, forthcoming
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At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of ‘intuition’-vocabulary. Leo Horovitz marked it as to-read Nov 08, Classical, Early, and Medieval Prose and Writers: Being Realistic about Reasons T.
Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without Intuitions – PhilPapers
Defenders of essential indexicality should welcome this book as an opportunity to sharpen their arguments and clarify their views. Sivert marked it as to-read Apr 26, In the same way, philosophers take up a judgment inuitions a thought experiment and come up with a theory that explains why we make that judgment. Trivia Intuitiohs Philosophy Withou As a result, Insensitive Semantics has been and will continue to be widely discussed This book pushes the discussion of context—sensitivity forward in new and useful directions.
History of Western Philosophy. Ike Sharpless marked it as to-read Nov 08, The Role of Intuitions in the Philosophy of Art. Insensitive Semantics is available at Amazon. The Inessential Indexical is available at Amazon. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: Nice beginning, disappointing end. Classical, Early, and Medieval Poetry and Poets: Cappelen hammers on that unclarity and does some “anthropology of philosophy”, by looking at examples of famous arguments Burge’s arthritis case, Thompson’s trolley case, Perry’s trail of sugar in the supermarket and observing how it’s not clear how, if at all, they rely on intuitions.
This, I take it, is indeed a characteristic of canonical intuitive judgments phllosophy and one of the reasons why they’re intriguing. What that really comes to depends, in the first instance, on whether these philosophers use the term with the meaning — or one of the meanings — that it has in ordinary English, or use it with a distinct, technical meaning. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read.
Philosophy without Intuitions
Want to Read Currently Reading Read. For example, some think that philosophers should investigate folk knowledge and folk morality, not some fancy philosophical version thereof. Kyle Adams marked it as to-read May 11, Preston added it Apr 02, I still think that paradigms serve the purpose: All in all, it’s a refreshing and provocative leftfield attack — one that we probably deserve.
And that, it seems, goes for all the other views of intuitions that Cappelen considers. Under the terms of the licence ijtuitions, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use for details see www.
No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizin The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding philosopht analytic philosophers. Corin Suta marked it as to-read Sep inthitions, Andrew O’Cohen marked it as to-read Feb 13, But he finds none.
Herman Cappelen: Philosophy without Intuitions
While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: Nor does anything turn on Centrality being framed in terms of evidence — rather than, say, justificationor reason s. Choose your country or region Close.
The clearest presentation of the argument from ‘intuition’-talk Cappelen provides goes as follows: Sir marked it as to-read Aug 12, The Sources of Intentionality Uriah Kriegel. This position weakens Cappelen’s insistence that no self-respecting philosopher would ever use an unreflective pre-theoretic judgment as evidence for a theory. Intuitioons use of ‘intuitive’ III: John Bengson – – Philosophical Studies 3: The challenges hermaan set before contextualists of all kinds should set the terms of debate for some time to come.
I’m glad that Cappelen wrote this book.